

Final Modification Report

CMP423: Generation- weighted Reference Node

Overview: This modification seeks to amend the reference node to generation-weighted instead of Demand-weighted

Modification process & timetable



Have 10 minutes? Read our [Executive summary](#)

Have 180 minutes? Read the full [Final Modification Report](#)

Have 240 minutes? Read the full Final Modification Report and Annexes.

Status summary: This report has been submitted to the Authority for them to decide whether this change should happen.

Panel recommendation: The Panel has recommended by majority that the Proposer's solution is implemented.

This modification is expected to have a: High impact on generation and Demand

Governance route Standard Governance modification assessed by a Workgroup.

Who can I talk to about the change?

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Executive Summary

This modification seeks to change the reference node from Demand-weighted to generation-weighted.

What is the issue?

The Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) transport model currently calculates incremental flows by bringing total generation and Demand into balance by pro-rata increasing all Demand using a 'Demand-weighted reference node'. This does not appropriately reflect how the system would respond to changes in User decisions and distorts the relative locational price signals produced by the methodology.

What is the solution and when will it come into effect?

Proposer's solution: Switching from a Demand-weighted reference node to a generation-weighted reference node.

Implementation date: 01 April 2027

What is the impact if this change is made?

High impact on generation and Demand. The impact on Generators will be to reduce the cost of generation locational charges and reduce the magnitude of the generation adjustment credit. The reduction in locational charges will tend to have the largest benefit for higher Annual Load Factor (ALF) Generators, while the reduction in Generator Adjustment Credit may result in a detrimental impact for low ALF Generators. The impact on Demand will be to increase the cost of Demand locational charges and correspondingly reduce the cost of the Demand Residual.

Workgroup conclusions: The Workgroup concluded by majority (7 out of 9 votes) that the Original better facilitated the Applicable Objectives than the Baseline.

Panel recommendation: The Panel has recommended by majority that the Proposer's solution is implemented.

Interactions¹

This proposal was developed through the [TNUoS Task Force](#) and has interactions with other Task Force work and modifications. This includes [CMP432](#) (Locational Onshore Security Factor), [CMP440](#) (Re-introduction of Demand TNUoS locational signals by removal of the zero price floor), [CMP442](#) (Introducing the option to fix Generator TNUoS

¹ The links to all CUSC modifications which interact with CMP423 can be found here and on page 55

charges) and CMP444² (Introducing a cap and floor to wider generation TNUoS charges).

What is the issue?

What is the defect the Proposer believes this modification will address?

The relevant defect identified by this proposal is that the TNUoS transport model currently calculates incremental flows by bringing total generation and Demand into balance by pro-rata increasing all Demand using a “Demand-weighted reference node”. For the reasons described in more detail below, this approach of using a Demand-weighted reference node is an issue because it is not cost reflective. It does not appropriately reflect how the system would respond to changes in User decisions, and it distorts the relative locational price signals produced by the charging methodology.

The current Demand-weighted reference node also creates an issue for effective competition. This is because the existing methodology is expected to result in collecting an increasing total TNUoS cost from generation wider locational charges, which would further worsen the competitive disadvantage of Great Britain (GB) Generators compared with Generators in other markets.

This modification proposes to rectify this defect by switching from a Demand-weighted reference node to a generation-weighted reference node instead.

Why change?

The Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC) describes a relevant key principle of TNUoS charging as to reflect incremental cost i.e. the change in system cost caused by a network User from the decisions that User makes:

*“The underlying rationale behind Transmission Network Use of System charges is that efficient economic signals are provided to Users when services are priced to reflect the **incremental costs** of supplying them. Therefore, charges should **reflect the impact that Users of the transmission system at different locations***

² Ofgem minded-to decision published 10 July 2025 was to reject CMP444. The consultation closed on 11 August 2025 with a decision expected in September 2025.

would have on the Transmission Owner's costs, if they were to increase or decrease their use of the respective systems. *These costs are primarily defined as the investment costs in the transmission system, maintenance of the transmission system and maintaining a system capable of providing a secure bulk supply of energy.”³ (CUSC 14.14.6, emphasis added)*

In order to reflect a correct incremental cost, it is necessary for the TNUoS charging methodology to appropriately model what resulting impact on the system would be caused by a User decision. For example, if a Generator were to increase, or reduce generation capacity at a particular location, then how would the rest of the system be likely to react in response to that decision and what corresponding incremental change in cost of network would that cause?

The TNUoS Transport and Tariff model calculates the impact of such decisions in terms of incremental changes in Megawatt kilometre (MWkm) power flows which may be either positive, or negative, contributing to higher, or lower charges (or credits) respectively. The model does this by adding 1 Megawatt (MW) of generation at each node in turn and applies adjustments to ensure that total generation and Demand remain equal and measuring the resulting change in MWkm flow across the whole of the transmission network.

The issue this modification addresses is whether the pro-rata adjustment to bring generation and Demand into balance should be carried out by the current approach of a pro-rata increase in Demand, or a pro-rata reduction in generation.

What is the solution?

Proposer's Original solution

Before Project TransmiT, the choice of reference node did not change either the magnitude, or relative locational signals faced by different Users because all Users paid their locational tariff and Residual tariff on the same charging base, so it was not a material issue of concern.

³ (CUSC – SECTION 1)

However, after Project TransmiT and within the current methodology, the choice of either generation, or Demand-weighted reference node does now matter, because it would change both the magnitude of charges, as well as the relative locational signals paid by different parties. This is because different Generators pay different elements of TNUoS charge, so changes in the value of tariff elements will impact different Generators differently. For example, conventional Generators pay the Peak Security tariff, while intermittent Generators do not, all Generators pay the Year Round Shared tariff by their own different station specific ALF, and conventional carbon Generators have their ALF applied to their Year Round Not-Shared tariff, while other Generators pay this at 100% of Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC).

The choice of reference node now also affects both the absolute and relative charges paid by Demand customers. This has arisen since the Demand Residual is now applied to a different charging base from the locational Demand charges. If Demand charges were to be further changed to apply Peak Security and Year Round charges to different charging bases, then changing the reference node would further impact the magnitude and relative price signals paid by different Demand Users.

Switching to a generation-weighted reference node would be better than the baseline in a number of ways, including those described below:

1) Better cost reflectivity: Charges would better reflect incremental transmission system cost/benefit that is caused by a User's decisions.

In practice, generation scales to meet Demand, Demand does not scale to meet generation. This principle of scaling generation to meet Demand applies in the reality of operating the energy system and also applies in the way NESO Network Options Assessment (NOA) process and the Security and Quality of Supply Standards (SQSS) operate.

Generation charges: Generation-weighted Reference Node is more cost reflective for generation charges

In practice, incremental increase (or decrease) in generation at one location will tend to cause a corresponding offsetting decrease (or increase) in generation at another location. It will not tend to cause changes in Demand.

This is demonstrated in several practical ways, such as the way Government sets targets for generation to meet Demand, where the relevant question is where that target generation capacity will be located. This is demonstrated in auctions, such as the Contracts for Difference (CfD) auction with budget caps where Generators compete and one Generator winning a contract would tend to displace a different Generator who did not win a contract. Similarly, for the Capacity Mechanism, Generators also compete to deliver a target required capacity, whereby one Generator winning a contract will tend to displace a different Generator that did not, and if a Generator closes, then more generation capacity needs to be procured through a future auction to replace it.

This principle of generation tending to balance with other generation applies to both Generator investment and closure decisions:

- **Impact of an increase in generation best reflected by a corresponding decrease in generation elsewhere:** Reductions in existing generation can only take place in locations where there is already existing generation that can close. Any corresponding reduction in hypothetical alternative generation, would also be best reflected by a weighted average of existing generation, because alternative new generation would be more likely to be weighted towards locations where there is already generation (as reflected by a generation-weighted node), not weighted towards locations where there is already Demand.
- **Impact of a reduction in generation best reflected by a corresponding increase in generation elsewhere:** For the purpose of providing a risk weighted average, corresponding increases in generation should take place in locations where there is already generation. This is because additional generation is more likely to occur at places where there is already generation (as reflected by a generation-weighted reference node) due to other limiting factors, such as: where there is access to gas grid, cooling, brown field sites, planning consents, wind resource, seabed

availability. By contrast, it is not appropriate for corresponding increases in generation to be weighted towards areas dominated by Demand, such as London city centre.

Demand charges: Generation-weighted Reference Node is more cost reflective for Demand

Increases (or reductions) in Demand will also tend to be met with corresponding increases (or reductions) in generation, not by offsetting changes in Demand elsewhere. This can also be demonstrated in practice by Government targets of generation required to meet changes in expected Demand, as well as scheme targets to procure appropriate generation capacities within the CfD's and Capacity Mechanism to meet any changes in the expected level of Demand.

By contrast, the current Demand-weighted reference node does not reflect reality, so is not cost reflective of the impact of Demand decisions on incremental network costs. Demand investment/closure decisions tend to be open-ended and independent of each other, so:

- **Increased Demand at one location**: An increase in Demand at a location does not tend to cause a corresponding closure of existing Demand at a different location. More realistically, an increase in Demand would cause an increased requirement for increased generation, so its impact would best be reflected by modelling a pro-rata increase in generation (as reflected by a generation-weighted reference node).
- **Reduced Demand at one location**: A reduction in Demand at a location does not tend to cause a corresponding increase in other Demand at other locations. More realistically, a reduction in Demand would cause a reduced requirement for generation, so its impact would best be reflected by modelling a pro-rata reduction in generation (as reflected by a generation-weighted reference node).

Better reflect the different generation scaling used by SQSS and Costs, Benefits, and Assumptions (CBA) for Demand Security and Economy

The SQSS and NESO network cost benefit modelling used by the *Network Options Assessment* (NOA) in the past, and now by strategic planning department including its work on the *Centralised Strategic Network Plan*, all use an approach of generation serving Demand consistent with this modification's move to a generation-weighted reference node.

This is described in more detail in **Annex 07**.

2) Better effective competition for GB generation vs international markets

An effect of the modification would be to reduce average Generator Wider TNUoS charges. This would (just as the Limiting Regulation EC838/2010 was designed to) reduce competitive distortions for transmission connected generation and large distribution connected Generators in GB, who pay TNUoS charges, compared with Generators in international markets and small distribution connected Generators in GB, who do not pay GB TNUoS charges.

3) Better effective competition between GB generation and Demand

More level playing field of price signal between voltage of connection, co-location, or behind customer meters

- i) **Locational signals:** Reduce distortion caused by Demand "floor at zero" and make Demand and generation locational charges more equal/opposite.
- ii) **Residual charges:** Reduce magnitude of both Demand Residual and Generator Adjustment Credit:
 - o Better enable Demand to take action to reduce their own TNUoS charges because Demand Residual charges are reduced as more of Demand charge is weighted towards locational instead of residual.

- Reduce distortions caused by different parties being exposed to different adjustments, or residuals. Better align the business case for generation and Demand across different voltages, co-located arrangements, and behind customer meters.

Legal text

The Proposer suggested the draft Legal text with proposed changes to CUSC Section 14 in a number of paragraphs: 14.15.27, 14.15.29, 14.15.52 and 14.21 to 14.24. These changes can be found in **Annex 10**.

Below are the sections with the substantive changes relating to how charges are calculated. 14.21 to 14.24 relate to illustrative examples:

"14.15.27 Using these baseline networks for Peak Security and Year Round backgrounds, the model then calculates for a given injection of 1MW of generation at each node, with a corresponding 1MW reduction of generation ~~offtake (net demand)~~ distributed across all generationdemand nodes in the network, the increase or decrease in total MWkm of the whole Peak Security and Year Round networks. The proportion of the 1MW reduction of generation ~~offtake~~ allocated to any given generationdemand node will be based on total background nodal generationnet-demand in the model. For example, with a total net GB generationdemand of 60GW in the model, a node with a generationnet-demand of 600MW would contain 1% of the reduction of generation~~offtake~~ i.e. 0.01MW."

"14.15.29 Using a similar methodology as described above in 14.15.27, the local and wider marginal km costs used to determine generation TNUoS tariffs are calculated by injecting 1MW of generation against the node(s) the generator is modelled at and reducingincreasing by 1MW the generationofftake across the distributed reference node. It should be noted that although the wider marginal km costs are calculated for both Peak Security and Year Round backgrounds, the local marginal km costs are calculated on the Year Round background."

*"14.15.52 **The Company** will review Connectivity at the beginning of a new price control period, and under exceptional circumstances such as major*

*system reconfigurations, or relevant modification changes. This will include a review of the centre of generation to reflect the location of zero MWkm in the Year Round background. If any such reassessment is required, it will be undertaken against a background of minimal change to existing Connectivity and in line with the notification process set out in the **ESO Licence**, the Transmission Licence and the CUSC.”*

Workgroup considerations

The Workgroup convened 09 times to discuss the issue as identified by the Proposer within the scope of the defect, develop potential solutions, and evaluate the proposal in relation to the Applicable Code Objectives.

Workgroup Discussion ahead of the Workgroup Consultation

Consideration of the Proposer’s solution

Cost reflectivity: of scaling generation to meet Demand

The Proposer outlined the background and rationale for raising the modification. The Proposer clarified that the TNUoS transport model currently calculates incremental flows by bringing total generation and Demand into balance by pro-rata increasing all Demand using a “Demand-weighted reference node”. The Proposer argued the current methodology is not cost-reflective and is detrimental for effective competition. Therefore, they proposed switching from a Demand-weighted reference node approach to one based on a generation-weighted reference node.

The Proposer provided a consultant’s report from Trident Economics titled ‘CMP423 – Generation or Demand-weighted reference node?’ (**Annex 03**) to the Workgroup. This report provided a detailed rationale and concluded the following:

- *The characteristics of the GB transmission system expansion suggest that a generation-weighted reference node is more appropriate than a Demand-weighted reference node for the Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP) calculation of incremental MWkms on which to base TNUoS tariffs”*

- *However, the GB transmission system is expanding rapidly across key transmission boundaries. In planning how much to expand transmission, the National Energy System Operator will be able to explicitly take into account the impact of new generation on the operating patterns of existing generation.*
- *Given that, in response to incremental generation at one point, the planned transmission system build can be reduced elsewhere, a Demand-weighted reference node would seem to overestimate the actual incremental MWkms required.*
- *CMP423 offers a straightforward approach to correcting this by replacing the Demand-weighted reference node with a generation-weighted reference node (actually replacing Demand scaling with generation scaling against a constant level of Demand)."*

One Workgroup member observed that if generation is increased, Demand will also increase, or generation will need to decrease elsewhere. Another Workgroup member noted that the scenario resulting in the lowest residual charge would be more cost reflective. However, an Authority representative mentioned that the solution should be agreed upon before the analysis, with the results supporting the solution and its initial rationale.

A Workgroup member questioned what the defect of the modification is and how the solution addresses it. The Proposer explained that the defect is the cost reflectivity associated with using a Demand-weighted reference node. They advised, in their opinion, that a generation-weighted reference node better represents the flexing in generation seen in reality.

Some Workgroup members queried whether changes in Demand patterns would impact the proposed benefit of the solution and another member noted that the Year Round background Demand should reflect Year Round conditions, rather than Peak Demand.

Effective competition: Beneficial impacts of a generation-weighted reference node

It was suggested that moving to a generation-weighted reference node will have several beneficial impacts on effective competition beyond the direct improvement in cost reflectivity. These relate to firstly reducing the size of the

Generator Adjustment Credit and secondly reducing the prevalence of negative Demand charges.

i. Better effective competition by reducing the magnitude of Generator Adjustment Credit

European limiting regulation 838/2010⁴ was introduced to better facilitate effective competition of generation across the European Union (EU) energy market as part of moving towards greater harmonisation, or at least prevent diversion, in the network different network charges paid by Generators in different markets across the EU. This was described in the report Charging the wrong way, by Renewable Infrastructure Development Group (RIDG):⁵

"A recent European Commission report points out that that "Cross-border competition between generators is likely to induce regulatory competition between Member States and, as such, likely to serve as an implicit upper limit to all types of [generator] charges, preventing larger divergence of within the EU... it is likely that the [generator] charges of the largest Member States in Continental Europe become the benchmark."⁶ In other words – the commission expects rational regulators to avoid disadvantaging their own generation fleet by aligning network charging with neighbouring countries. By not doing that, regulators risk undermining the competitiveness of domestic power plants compared to imported power that can offer lower prices because it is not exposed to the same regulation."

Currently, GB Generator Wider TNUoS charges breach the upper limit of this harmonising range of €2.50 per MWh, and the NESO 10 year forecast showed this upper breach generation Wider locational TNUoS charges collecting too much to be progressively worsening over time. This upper breach was shown to be requiring a growing generation adjustment credit to bring average charges back into line, rising from £11.64 per Kilowatt (kW) in 2029/30 to £20.10 per kW by 2033/34⁷.

⁴ Regulation – 838/2010 – EN – EUR-Lex

⁵ Charging the wrong way, RIDG,2021

⁶ EUR-Lex Access to European Law


⁷ 10 Year Projection 2024-25 to 2033-24 External Report Tables v1.2.xlsx

Moving to a generation-weighted reference node would be better for effective competition in this regard in at least two ways.

Firstly, CMP423 Original solution will deliver Generator Wider locational TNUoS charges that are more consistent with the EU harmonisation objective by ensuring the underlying charges comply with the limiting regulation themselves, reducing the need for a separate adjustment credit. This effect is shown in analysis presented by NESO, including the impact on the Generator Adjustment Credit, below.

Secondly, CMP423 Original solution will result in GB Generator charges that are towards the lower end of the €0 to €2.50 per MWh range. This better aligns with the EU Commission expectation that competition across Europe would make it efficient for Generator network charges to tend towards an average of €0 per MWh.

The graph below shows the Generator Adjustment Credit as a substantial negative number (credit) in the Baseline, then either positive (charge), or zero following CMP423.




Demand and generation proportions

One Workgroup member queried whether there was an overall increase to consumer costs as a result of the modification. The NESO Subject Matter Expert (SME) noted that the results shown were purely based on TNUoS costs and that there may be other impacts that offset the costs and even provide benefits in the long term.

A later section of this report outlines the potential reduction in cost to customers from reduced CfD strike prices.


Historical context of Demand and generation charges




For Generator charges, Ofgem's Targeted Charging Review (TCR) decision resulted in a large step-change increase in the total revenue collected from Generators from 2021/22. The implementation of CMP423 would therefore go some way to mitigate this impact and reduce the total revenue collected from Generators closer to where they would have been before the TCR increase. This was explained by NESO (then ESO) in 2021:

"The revenue to be recovered from generators is £774m, an increase of £399m from 2020/21 and a decrease of £39m since the Draft tariffs. This increase from 2020/21 is mainly driven by the implementation of TGR. Local tariffs have been removed from the EU generation cap calculation. The generation residual has been removed from TNUoS charge, but to ensure compliance with the EU generation cap, an adjustment element has been introduced instead." (NESO final TNUoS tariff report for 2021/22)

The Proposer provided the following graphic (**Annex 08**) based on historical data. This shows the step-change increase in revenue collected from Generators from 2021/22, so CMP423 returns Generator charges to the pre-2021/22 trend level.



The next graphic uses the same data as above (**Annex 08**) but expressed in percentage terms. This shows the large step-change increase in Generator charges from 2021/22 as a percentage of total TNUoS collected and that CMP423 returns the Generator share closer to previous levels. The Proposer suggested CMP423 is more consistent with the principles of Ofgem's Targeted Charging Review decision that it is best value for customers for revenue collection to be wholly from final Demand.



ii. **Better effective competition by reducing the occurrence of negative Demand charges**

It was suggested that CMP423 Original solution will reduce the occurrence of negative Demand charges, and this will firstly improve effective competition between Demand customers at different locations, as well as secondly improve effective competition between Demand and generation.

Demand TNUoS charges have always been floored at £zero to prevent a perverse operational signal to increase Demand at peak to earn TNUoS Demand credits. This is a particular issue for Demand because Demand TNUoS is based on time of use, so can distort operational dispatch, compared with Generator TNUoS, which is based on TEC, and does not distort operational dispatch.

The current Demand-weighted reference node creates a particular problem for Demand charges, since it results in Demand in the Southern most parts of GB being close to £zero (not exceeding £10 per kW), and Demand charges everywhere else being negative, so floored at £zero. This means baseline results in very flat locational Demand charge with ineffective locational signals for Demand, as shown in the NESO analysis section of this report.

This floor at £zero issue only recently arose following Ofgem's TCR decision to remove the Demand Residual from the Triad charge and apply it as a fixed charge per site instead, through CMP335 and CMP336 implemented in charges from April 2023. Prior to this, the Demand Residual charge was large enough that Demand TNUoS Triad charges never, in practice, became negative, enabling the full locational gradient of price signals to apply to Demand. At the time of the TCR decision, Ofgem acknowledged that the effect of the floor at £zero policy effectively flattening the Demand gradient was an issue and expected this to be resolved via a subsequent CUSC modification proposal.

*"3.31. Consequently, the Workgroup developed three proposals for dealing with any negative forward-looking charges. As noted above, the forward-looking element of the demand charge will be under consideration as part of our proposed further work on transmission charges , and so it is feasible that **the mechanisms that deal with negative forward-looking charges may be impacted**. It is possible that as a result, changes to locational signals introduced by CMP343 may be altered, or **the mechanism itself may only be temporary**.*

because it is subsequently superseded by other TNUoS reforms.”
(Ofgem Decision CMP343)

Since Ofgem’s TCR decision, and arising from the Charging Futures TNUoS Task Force, modification CMP440 has been raised for the “Re-introduction of Demand TNUoS locational signals by removal of the zero price floor”. The proposed from CMP440 is to spread the negative Demand charge over a larger number of periods to dilute the incentive for Demand to increase its load at peak periods.

In this regard, moving to a generation-weighted reference node complements CMP440 in resolving the issue identified in Ofgem’s TCR decision by reducing both the number of negative tariff zones and reducing the magnitude of negative charges for those that remain. In this way, it reduces the magnitude of the defect CMP440 is trying to resolve and mitigates unintended consequences by reducing the magnitude of any remaining distortionary incentive for customers to increase their load at peak times.

In this way, CMP423 (complementing CMP440), delivers on Ofgem’s expectation following the TCR decision on CMP343 and the TNUoS Task Force to better deal with negative forward looking charges for Demand. Reinstating the full locational gradient for Demand will have several beneficial impacts, including:

Firstly, improving effective competition between Demand at different locations. One of the challenges identified during the Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) process is how to best provide an incentive for Demand to locate closer to areas with surplus generation. CMP423 would go a long way to delivering this solution and combined with CMP440 can deliver a Demand TNUoS signal that is better, more predictable and more effective compared with a zonal pricing. A Workgroup member noted that the Ofgem open letter ⁸addresses Demand and storage collectively as a potential solution to these challenges. The member expressed concern that this modification may harm storage incentive to locate closer to Demand.


Secondly, improving effective competition between Demand and generation. It would move closer to Demand and generation Wider locational charges being broadly equal and opposite to each other


⁸ Open Letter: Reforming network charging signals to align with the Government’s decision on the future design of Great Britain’s electricity system

The NESO tariff and revenue analysis (**Annex 04**) shows that CMP423 will increase the value of Demand locational tariffs.

This will increase the relative locational Demand signal across more zones, because most Northern zones will no longer fall below the floor at £zero (it is particularly useful, the proposer would contend, if proposal CMP440 is not approved).


It will rebalance revenue collection from Demand with relatively more revenue being collected from the Demand locational charges, which will tend to reduce the value recovered from the Demand Residual charges.





For Demand charges prior to 2023/24, the Triad charge was much larger than it is currently for 2025/26, the floor at £zero was not a limiting factor and Demand customers were exposed to the full range of locational price signals across GB. While CMP423 would not return Demand locational charges to their full pre-2023/24 levels, it would go some way towards it.

The Proposer provided the following graph using historical NESO data to illustrate this effect. The additional Proposer analysis is available in **Annex 08**.



Consideration of the solution: Scaling of Storage and Interconnectors

One Workgroup member queried whether Interconnectors and Storage acted as a substitute for Generators, noting that they thought they served an arbitrage function instead, as generation still needs to occur for them to work. The NESO SME agreed to investigate how scaling factors could be removed from the analysis and the possibility of running the model excluding Interconnectors and Storage. One Workgroup member queried whether excluding these Users was appropriate.







NESO presented tariff and revenue impact analysis (**Annex 04**) with and without scaling Storage and Interconnectors. Following the Workgroup discussion and consideration of NESO modelling, the Proposer decided that the Original solution would treat Storage and Interconnectors in the same way, and pro-rata scale them in the same way as other forms of generation when applying the Generation-weighted reference node.

Impact on Generators' charges – NESO Analysis









The NESO SME presented analysis which illustrated the multi-year impact of CMP423 on tariffs and revenue for 2024/25 and 2029/30 the last year of the five-year forecast (**Annex 05**). In a later Workgroup, the Authority representative provided an update to Workgroup members with Ofgem's minded-to decision which was to reject CMP444 Introducing a cap and floor to wider generation TNUoS charges. Following this update, the Workgroup discussion on related CMP444 analysis can now be found in **Annex 06**.

The NESO SME produced analysis for two specific years, 2024/25 and 2029/30, to the Workgroup to provide insight into how the impact of the modification may evolve over time. A selection of relevant graphs are provided below:

Impact on £/kW generation tariff elements



Impact on £/kW charges paid by different technologies





Change in £/kW charge due to CMP423



For 45% intermittent Generators, the reduction in charge is larger in Northern zones because part of the Northern reduction is in the Year Round not shared tariff, on which intermittent Generators pay 100% of their TEC. In Southern zones, the network is fully shared, so the reduction in locational charge is only from the Year Round shared tariff on which the impact is reduced according to a Generator's ALF.

For 40% conventional carbon Generators, the reduction in charge in Northern zones is smaller than that for intermittent Generators, as conventional carbon Generators have their ALF discount applied to both the Year Round shared and not shared tariff elements. However, the reduction in Southern zones is larger than for intermittent Generators because conventional carbon Generators receive a reduction from both the Peak Security and Year Round tariff elements.

For 10% conventional carbon Generators (representing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)), there is a reduction in the overall charge in 24/25. However, in 29/30 the reduction to the Generator Adjustment Credit outweighs the reduction to the Peak Security and Year Round tariffs, resulting in an increase to the overall charge. One Workgroup member stated that this increase for low ALF generators, such as BESS, are projected to continue beyond 2029, and affects investment cases where developers assume 15–20 year project lives.

The reduction in charges is largest for 75% conventional low carbon generation, because they pay the Year Round not shared tariff on 100% of their TEC, obtain a larger benefit from the reduction in Year Round shared tariff due to their higher ALF, and they benefit from the reduction in both the Peak Security as well as Year Round tariff elements.











Change in £/kW Generation charges over time

The NESO analysis showed that the trend change in TNUoS charges over time dominates the reduction in Generator charges from CMP423. For Northern Generators, this proposal will partially mitigate the large increase in charges over time, so that even after this modification, Generators in Northern zones would still pay charges that are considerably more expensive than in 2024/25.

Correspondingly, Generators in Southern zones where charges are expected to become cheaper (or credits become larger), would also continue this trend.





Impact on cost to customers via reduced CfD Strike Prices

One Workgroup member queried whether there was likely to be an impact on CfD prices as a result of the distributional impact of the modification.


A report by Aurora, [Consumer Savings Under TNUoS Reform Proposals Report](#) outlined the benefit to GB customers of two TNUoS modifications (CMP444 and CMP432) by reducing the cost of TNUoS, therefore reducing the cost of CfD Strike Prices. The Proposer calculated that by taking the numbers from the Aurora report, the benefit to customers between 2028-2050 equates to roughly £75m for every £1 reduction in CfD Strike price. The Aurora report assumed that Scottish Generators set the CfD clearing price 90% of the time.

The Proposer suggested this can be combined with the NESO analysis indicated that CMP423 would reduce TNUoS charges for Scottish 51% ALF (as assumed by Aurora) intermittent generation, by £6.32 per kW for 2029/30, which equates to a saving of £1.41 per MWh.

Taken together, this suggests that if CMP423 reduced TNUoS charges and CfD Strike Prices by c£1.41 over the period, then it could deliver a saving to customers of c£107m in terms of reduced cost to customers of CfD payments.

Impact on local circuit tariffs

One workgroup member queried whether there was any impact on local circuit tariffs due to this modification. NESO provided analysis (**Annex 09**) showing a marginal reduction in all local circuit tariffs, on average by -£0.01/kW. The largest observed movement is for the Kergord local circuit in 24/25, with a reduction of -£0.39/kW (-0.7%).



Workgroup Consultation Summary

The Workgroup held their Workgroup Consultation between 29 May and 20 June 2025 and received 14 non-confidential responses and 0 confidential responses. The full responses and a summary of the responses can be found **Annex 11**.

The respondents included representatives from five industry parties: Eleven Generators, two Suppliers, one Storage entity, one System Operator, and one other.

Industry's perspective on CMP423 in relation to each Applicable CUSC

Objective:

Objective d

- Enhances competition by aligning GB Generators' network charges more closely with international standards, reducing competitive disadvantages.
- Reduces the differential in tariffs between North and South GB, promoting fairer competition among Generators in different regions.
- Adjusts the tariff gradient, enabling a more balanced allocation of risk between Northern and Southern Generators.
- Enhanced Demand Signals: The modification reinstates locational price signals for Demand, fostering better competition between Demand customers and grid-connected generation.

Objective e

- Switching to a generation-weighted reference node improves cost reflectivity by accurately representing the incremental transmission system costs or benefits driven by a User's decisions.
- The proposed approach addresses distortions in locational Demand signals, ensuring they better reflect the underlying system costs.
- The generation-weighted reference node more accurately reflects the system's response to changes in generation and Demand, correcting the current methodology's assumptions.

Objective f

- A generation-weighted reference node better models the transition to a low carbon GB transmission system.

- Ensures that the charging methodology more accurately reflects the realities of additional Demand and generation on the network on the reinforcements this drives, and, therefore, the costs incurred by transmission licensees.
- The growing gap between generation and Demand locations means using an unsuitable reference node is increasingly problematic and likely to worsen. Addressing this defect promptly is crucial.

Objective g

- One respondent felt better compliance with Electricity Regulation 838/2010 will be achieved, particularly in limiting Generators' transmission charges to within €0 to €2.50. This modification will reduce the need for additional corrections to maintain compliance.

Objective h

- Two respondents felt the proposal results in lower levels of tariff adjustment which would increase the efficiency of the implementation and administration of the system charging methodology.

Two respondents stated that the proposal did not better facilitate any of the Applicable CUSC Objectives. One of these respondents commented that they did not believe that moving to a generation-weighted reference node would increase the cost-reflectivity of transmission charges. The respondent felt that with electricity Demand expected to rise significantly due to the transition to Net Zero and due to the build out of many large new data centres, new generation capacity will be needed and the assumption that new generation will displace existing generation with static Demand is not appropriate for the future.

The other respondent that stated that the proposal did not better facilitate any of the Applicable CUSC Objectives felt that the proposal, if implemented, creates the risk of locational (and operational) price signals that conflict with signals produced by other initiatives such as the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan and the Centralised Strategic Network Plan. The respondent also felt that increasing the proportion of TNUoS revenue from Demand to fix the zero-price floor issue had not been justified. The respondent also felt that the assumption that new generation will displace existing generation with static Demand will not always be appropriate for the future.

Implementation Approach:

Twelve respondents supportive of the implementation approach gave the following reasons:

- Allows time to make the necessary changes to Section 14 of the CUSC
- Gives parties time to account for the resulting tariff impacts.
- Beneficial for bidders in the Allocation Round 7 (AR7) CfD auction to provide better certainty of their TNUoS charges before they reach final investment decision.

No comments were made by the two respondents not supportive of the proposed implementation.

Industry's opinion on CMP423:

Seven respondents provided further comments:

- Implementing CMP423 independently of CMP444 will result in fairer cost distribution among network users and significant savings for consumers without distorting the cost reflectivity of charges.
- The Demand-weighted Reference Node is causing distortions that will worsen with future transmission system reinforcements, requiring immediate correction.
- Long-term TNUoS reform and strategic reviews like REMA are necessary to address broader challenges, aiming for higher locational cost reflectivity and reliable predictability.
- Ofgem should decide on CMP423 before investors in CfD AR7 make final decisions and before CMP442 fixed charges are introduced, as CMP423 alone may not sufficiently reduce charges to attract new investment in Northern zones.

Locational Demand Charges:

Ten respondents agree that the modification would greatly restore the gradient of locational Demand charges for the following reasons:

- It will strengthen the locational signal for Demand charges to promote better competition and fairness.

- Make customer charges more affordable
- Complements CMP440 and aligns with the broader direction of wider charging policy

However, one of these respondents felt this could be better achieved by CMP440 which aims to re-introduce Demand TNUoS locational signals by removal of the zero price floor.

The one respondent who disagreed felt that the aim of this modification was not intended to address the *gradient* of locational Demand charges, and that it had not been demonstrated that changing the reference node is the most appropriate solution to the zero-price floor issue.

Another respondent that also stated that it had not been demonstrated that changing the reference node is the most appropriate solution to the zero-price floor issue questioned whether modifying the Transport and Tariff model is the most appropriate way of increasing the gradient of locational Demand charges.

Revenue collection:

Eight respondents commented on the change of revenue collection proportions between generation and Demand:

- Proposal aims to deliver a more cost-reflective tariff model, potentially saving customers £107m in CfD payments.
- Moving more TNUoS revenue collection to Demand Users is seen as more efficient and consistent with Ofgem's Targeted Charging Review principles.
- Reducing transmission charges for Generators aligns with the UK Government's pro-growth strategy and enhances international competitiveness.
- The proposal supports regulatory improvements that promote investment and economic growth in the GB power generation sector.
- There is concern that shifting revenue recovery to Demand Users could increase costs for consumers and risk supplier insolvency.

- One respondent that disagreed also stated that it had not been demonstrated that changing the reference node is the most appropriate solution to the zero-price floor issue because it is not a relevant defect and, therefore, was considered in detail by the Workgroup.

Interaction with other modifications:

All respondents noted interactions with other modifications:

- CMP423, CMP432, and CMP444 all aim to correct flaws in the current methodology and can be independently approved and implemented without affecting each other's validity.
- Concluding CMP423, CMP432, CMP440, and CMP442 before implementing CMP444 and sharing updated projections to 2035 will ensure informed decision-making and benefit the industry.
- The implementation (if approved, notwithstanding the minded-to) of CMP444, CMP423, and CMP432 would enhance predictability, reduce volatility, lower TNUoS charges, and ultimately decrease consumer bills.
- Concerns about the lack of coordination between CMP423 and CMP444, the adverse impacts on Southern Generators, and propose that CMP423, CMP440, and CMP442 be considered together for better clarity and decision-making.
- Modifying the cap and floor to reflect CMP423's outcome is necessary to correct tariffs based on a flawed methodology.
- More efficient for CMP423 to be decided upon, and if approved, implemented prior to users being allowed to fix their TNUoS charges under CMP442.
- CMP440 would better address the defect caused by the floor on Demand TNUoS charges as it seeks to remove the floor entirely, removing more than just *part* of the distortion that the floor represents, more directly addressing why the floor was implemented.
- A response argued that all of these modifications are beneficial and complementary, urging Ofgem to approve all of them (or if necessary, an appropriate Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modification (WACM)), as part of a package to improve TNUoS.

- Interactions with CMP444, CMP432, CMP442, and CMP440 should be considered holistically to avoid inefficiency, with CMP444 WACMI seen as the most effective solution by a respondent for re-balancing TNUoS charges.
- These interactions should be more carefully examined to avoid any unintended consequences.
- There may be unintended consequences because they claimed that CMP442 and CMP444 are intended to blunt baseline price signals while it is claimed that CMP423 is intended to make price signals more cost reflective.

Generation Displacement:

Eight respondents made comments on whether the assumption that a change in generation will displace generation elsewhere is appropriate both now and, in the future, and how this applies or is relevant to the modification:

- To balance the system generation is scaled to Demand and not vice versa and therefore the methodology should follow the same principle.
- It's new generation capacity developments and not new Demand that will influence future network needs. To benefit consumers, the goal should be to follow the most optimised and cost-effective generation siting strategy. This assumption is suitable and aligns with the current GB system and its future operations.
- As renewable energy becomes a larger part of the generation mix, it faces geographic limitations such as wind resources, seabed leases, and planning availability.
- With CMP434 and CMP435 implemented, there is now a clear capacity limit for any generation technology connecting to the GB transmission network, currently governed by the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan for each technology and in the future by the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan (SSEP).

Two respondents felt further analysis was required to assess the validity of this assumption. One of these respondents made the following points:

- The transition to renewable energy involves integrating diverse technologies with distinct load factors and characteristics, unlike the uniform nature of thermal generation.
- Changes in generation should not be seen as simple like-for-like displacements due to the unique factors and locations of renewable energy sources.

One respondent noted that the increase in electricity Demand and generation capacity expected by 2035 suggests that the current Demand-weighted reference node is more cost-reflective of the expanding system. This indicates that new generation will meet rising Demand, rather than displacing existing generation, which they claimed is contrary to the assumptions behind CMP423's proposed generation-weighted reference node.

Another respondent felt that the assumption that new generation will displace existing generation with static Demand will not always be appropriate for the future because of other potential consumption profiles, such as hydrogen electrolyzers ramping up production in line with when renewables are generating sufficient electricity.

Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS):

A respondent to the consultation had stated that the modification reinstates locational price signals for Demand, fostering better competition between Demand customers and grid-connected generation. A Workgroup member commented that it does, however, disincentivise allocating BESS in the South if the TNUoS charge becomes less negative. The Proposer responded to say this is not correct. The relative locational generation charge signal for Storage remains the same, so it does not change the relative locational signal for Storage. The locational charge reduction is the same for all locations and the Generator Adjustment Credit increases the same for all locations.

The Proposer did agree that BESS (due to low generation load factor) overall Generator charge is either relatively unchanged, or slightly increased in later years, but this does not change the relative locational signal for BESS between North and South.

One consultation response described how better compliance with Electricity Regulation 838/2010 will be achieved and that this modification will reduce the need for additional corrections to maintain compliance. A Workgroup member explained how this is a key driver of revenue/reduced charges for BESS in key locations due to low ALF, and so the reduction in the adjustment tariff is a bad locational signal for BESS. The Proposer disagreed explaining firstly, Generator Adjustment Credit is not part of the locational signal. Secondly, the Generator Adjustment Credit is the same for all locations, so it does not change the relative locational signal for BESS between North and South. Thirdly, the change in overall BESS TNUoS charge is very small compared with other technologies.

A respondent to the consultation stated that the modification reinstates locational price signals for Demand, fostering better competition between Demand customers and grid-connected generation. One Workgroup member noted that due to the low ALF of BESS projects, the reduction in the adjustment tariff can change TNUoS from a revenue to a charge in areas where NESO should be incentivising BESS deployment, and so this isn't necessary a locational signal for BESS if considered as Demand in this context.

Legal Text Comments:

Eleven respondents agreed that the legal text satisfies the intent of the modification.

Post Workgroup Consultation Discussion

The Proposer highlighted specific consultation responses that were particularly helpful to discuss, including assumptions about generation displacement and the impact on Demand charges.

Generation Displacement:

The Proposer responded to the consultation response that suggested with growing Demand, it is incorrect to assume that generation will displace generation with static Demand. The Proposer argued that while this response claims to contradict the modification, it should be viewed as supporting it, as CMP423 aims to deliver appropriate price signals for both generation and

Demand by assuming that it is generation that flexes to meet incremental changes in either generation, or Demand. The scenario described by the respondent is more consistent with a generation-weighted reference node where an increase in Demand is met by an increase in generation. By contrast, the baseline Demand-weighted reference node incorrectly assumes that an increase in Demand would be met by a reduction in demand elsewhere, while generation remained static.

The respondent clarified that the generation-weighted reference node assumes new capacity is commissioned at the same rate as old capacity is decommissioned, implying perfect displacement across the network. However, with current increases in generation capacity, this assumption no longer holds, as new generation is not simply replacing existing capacity. This approach may have been valid years ago, but it doesn't reflect today's significant growth in generation capacity.

The Proposer explained this is a straw man argument that misrepresents the rationale for the modification. This is because the modification does not assume new generation capacity is necessarily commissioned at the same rate as old generation capacity is decommissioned. By contrast, the modification assumes that an incremental change in generation (increase or decrease) will tend to be met with a corresponding incremental change in generation elsewhere, while an incremental change in Demand (increase or decrease) will also tend to be met with an incremental change in generation elsewhere. It models this by adjusting generation capacity on a pro-rata basis of scaled generation, which firstly recognises that different types of generation will respond differently, secondly that generation capacity can only reduce in locations where generation is already located, and thirdly that increases in generation tend to be more closely correlated with locations of existing generation than locations of existing Demand.

One Workgroup member generally agreed with the respondent's perspective, emphasising that it's important to consider the current purpose and constraints of the model. Highlighting, that maintaining balance in the system is crucial, even as some elements grow, and others decline. While he supported the overall

direction, the Workgroup member stressed focusing on incremental changes given present limitations. Another Workgroup member observed that, over the long term, generation patterns remain stable. They argued that current data may be skewed, so they support focusing on long-term trends.

The Proposer discussed another comment that noted differences in generations should not be viewed as straightforward replacements because of the distinct characteristics and locations associated with renewable energy sources. The Proposer had some sympathy for this comment as the generation-weighted reference node uses scaled generation TEC, so it already takes account of different characteristics and doesn't do a simple like for like. For example, in the year round background, wind is scaled at 70% and conventional is scaled variably down to 10%. The respondent appreciated the clarification, noting it was worth considering.

Locational Demand Charges:

Regarding whether reinstating the gradient of locational Demand charges would be beneficial, one respondent indicated that CMP440 may more effectively accomplish this goal across all the currently negatively priced zones by reintroducing Demand TNUoS locational signals in all such zones, through the removal of the zero price floor.

The Proposer clarified that CMP423 stands alone, aiming to improve cost reflectivity and the outcome of adjusting the demand gradient, is also better for effective competition. The Proposer emphasised that CMP423 complements rather than competes with CMP440 and is not justified solely by its effect on demand charges. Workgroup members agreed, this modification is independent and CMP440 is incidental.

The NESO SME agreed CMP423 and CM440 are two different solutions that have an effect of reinstating the demand gradient, but they are not alternatives and both could be approved.

Revenue collection:

A respondent to the consultation had expressed concern that shifting revenue collection from generation to Demand users could raise costs for consumers and

potentially threaten supplier stability. They questioned the fairness and cost reflectiveness of this change.

The Proposer argued that cost-reflective charges under the modification would ultimately benefit customers and improve competition. They noted that Demand charges are typically passed through to customers and that Suppliers, especially domestic ones, should have sufficient notice to adjust. The residual charge would decrease, while the locational charge would increase, but these costs are also likely to be passed on, so Supplier insolvency is unlikely to be an issue.

One Workgroup member agreed with the Proposer, noting that while the issue is complex, TNUoS is a fixed amount that ultimately gets passed on to consumers. The Workgroup member also understood the respondent's concerns. Another Workgroup member concurred, adding that the Supply side of the industry has taken steps to increase its resilience; this member would be surprised if this change alone caused Supplier solvency issues, as Suppliers have handled greater challenges in recent years.

Interaction with Other Modifications:

The Proposer mentioned that all respondents noted interactions with other modifications, and some respondents felt that these should be considered together for better clarity. Several Workgroup members noted that CMP423 can stand alone.

Terms of Reference Overview

a) Consider EBR implications

Workgroup members agreed that this modification does not affect the Electricity Balancing Regulation (EBR), and all 14 respondents to the Workgroup consultation concurred (**Annex 11**).


b) Consider implications for the network sharing calculation in the Transport and Tariff model

The Proposer noted that the Connectivity map within the Transport and Tariff model may change if the reference node was amended.


The Proposer explained why the Original solution includes a change in the Transport and Tariff model sharing connectivity diagram and what that change should be.

- **Proposed feature:**
 - **Update “TxNetwork” tab table:** Network connectivity diagram currently reflects the old Demand-weighted reference node, so will need to be updated to reflect the new generation-weighted reference node.
 - **Update “Connection map” tab diagram:** Only for explanatory purpose
- **Impact of updating connectivity diagram:** Only affects sharing split between Year Round Shared versus Year Round Not-shared. Does not impact Peak Security tariffs, and does not impact total Year Round tariff (Shared plus Not-shared).
- **The impact of not updating the Reference Node in the Connectivity diagram:** Would distort the sharing calculation. Changing the reference node in the Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code would only change the Year Round Shared tariff, leaving the Year Round Not-shared tariff unchanged.

The Proposer explained that by changing to a generation-weighted reference node, the Year Round incremental MWkm weighted average zero point moves north, as shown in the graph below.



The Proposer described how that change would be reflected in the TNUoS Transport and Tariff model, as per the figures below.



The Proposer clarified that this change would be practically reflected in the Transport and Tariff model “TxNetwork” tab.

The Workgroup discussed and agreed that the analysis covers the implications for the network sharing calculation in the Transport and Tariff model.


c) Consider potential locations for new generation such as via the TEC Register, seabed leasing, or other planning sources

The Workgroup asked for clarification to be sought from the CUSC panel on what is meant by Terms of Reference (c). A Panel member responded to say his interpretation is to consider where the new generation will be geographically located and the impact this will have on the CMP423 solution i.e. the generation-weighted reference node.


Running the model with different scenarios, such as placing a large Generator in the North and then in the South, to explicitly show the impact on tariffs was the approach agreed by the Workgroup to address this Terms of Reference.

A Workgroup member requested that the Proposer look at trends in Future Energy Scenarios (FES) Scenarios in relation to this Term of Reference and asked for the graphs shown to be extended to cover the levels of Generation by zone with Peak Demand and Year Round Demand. One Workgroup member queried what the change in Generation capacity would look like out to 2040, so the Proposer agreed to extend the graphics they had presented.

The Proposer presented some analysis regarding how the location of generation and Demand may change over time, based on the NESO FES Leading The Way scenario. The Proposer explained that this showed that while the relative locations of Demand remained relatively unchanged between 2025 and 2035, there was a large change in the locational capacities of generation. The Proposer expressed that this data supported the principle of CMP423 in as far as it showed that additional generation capacity is expected to disproportionately locate in areas where there is already generation located, and by contrast, new generation is not expected to be driven by locations where Demand is located.⁹



⁹ Data estimated based on ETYS 2023 report, Leading the Way FES Scenario




Using the same FES data, the Proposer also showed a graph of the changes in generation capacity broken down by technology type. They stated that this showed:


- Low carbon & renewables capacities increase significantly in Scotland and North of England.
- For N.Wales & Midlands, and S.Wales & S.England, low carbon build is similar to reduction in fossil fuel capacity.
- Only a small overall increase in southern Capacity

The Proposer presented further analysis on the locations of new generation and explained that this further supports the position that new generation is more likely to locate where there is existing generation, rather than locate where there is existing Demand. The presentation was summarised in the figures below.

Location of new generation is closer to existing generation than demand



Location of new generation is closer to existing generation than demand



d) Consider the impact on tariffs that may arise from changes in the way circuits may be placed into either Peak Security and Year Round buckets.

An Authority representative confirmed that when determining which background a circuit sits in, depends on which scenario it has the biggest flow, rather than the biggest change in flow. One Workgroup member advised they thought that the modification would not have an impact on the way circuits

are placed into buckets. A NESO SME confirmed this as reflected within the analysis.

The Proposer presented that the change in reference node has no impact on which buckets the circuits are placed into. The buckets are determined by the background flow before considering the incremental flows and reference node, therefore circuits will remain in the same buckets, regardless of the change in reference node.

The Workgroup concluded that this modification does not have any impact on the way circuits may be placed into either Peak Security, or Year Round buckets.

e) Consider the impact on Demand customers contribution from a different location signal especially those unable to react to those signals

The impact on Demand customers is explained in the section of this document on NESO's tariff impact analysis (Pages 19 to 20) and **Annex 04**.

f) Consider interactions with other Task Force modifications

One Workgroup member queried how enduring the solution was, given the current developments within the TNUoS Taskforce. The Proposer also advised there is likely to be a new modification raised in the future regarding Demand charges, which could change the impact of CMP423, and advised that interactions could be assessed when this modification was raised.

The Proposer highlighted the following quotes from the Ofgem published decision letter on urgency for CMP423 to Workgroup members.

Ofgem urgency decision for CMP423:

- *"We agree with the rationale that if this Proposal was to be progressed, it should be **done on time to feed into the cap and floor design.**"*
- *"However, although we are not granting urgency for CMP423, we do agree with the Proposer that the timing of any CMP423 decision should be considered in the context of, and be made **ahead of, any fixed price TNUoS methodology as proposed through CMP442,** as this would then allow any relevant changes to the methodology to be incorporated into*

NESO's forecast to allow tariffs to be fixed at an appropriate level."
[Emphasis added]

The Workgroup highlighted CMP440 and the discussion is captured on page 18.

All respondents to the Workgroup consultation reported interactions with other live modifications, including CMP432, CMP440, CMP442, and CMP444, which are detailed in the Workgroup consultation summary (**Annex 11** and pages 33 and 34). The analysis and discussion for the interaction specifically for CMP444 can be found in **Annex 06**.

g) Consider if the assumption that change in generation will displace generation elsewhere is an appropriate assumption now and in the future.

This Term of Reference is covered in the report under "Proposer's solution" (page 6) and "Consideration of the Proposer's solution" (page 11). To avoid repetition, it is not duplicated here. Comments from Workgroup consultation respondents are summarised in **Annex 11** and between pages 34 to 35.

h) Consider whether the reduction within generation charges approaches the euro floor in the limiting regulation and what would happen in that circumstance

The Proposer presented to the Workgroup their understanding of the implications of CMP423 for the € 2.50 Euro cap. The Proposer explained why the Adjustment Tariff would maintain Generator charges within the €0 to €2.50 range by bringing average generation charges either up to €0, or down to €2.50 per MWh (with error margin). The included the following references from the CUSC.

CUSC 14.14.5

"vii.) If having applied the exclusion of Charges for Physical Assets Required for Connection The Company identifies that an adjustment to TNUoS Charges is required to remain compliant with the Limiting Regulation then an Adjustment Tariff will be applied to all Generators in the following circumstances.

a) **The Adjustment Tariff will be applied if The Company identifies that either.**

a. Annual average TNUoS charges payable by Generator Users will **fall below €0/MWh**

OR

b. Annual average TNUoS charges payable by Generator Users will **exceed €2.50/MWh adjusted by a risk margin** to allow for error in tariff setting.

b) Where annual average TNUoS charges to Generators are positive under the GCharge (Forecast) the Adjustment Tariff will be applied if the Adjustment Revenue is less than £0. The Adjustment Revenue is expressed as:

$$AdjRevenue = (GO * ((CapEC * (1 - y)) * ER)) - GCharge(Forecast)$$

c) Where annual average TNUoS charges to Generators are negative under the GCharge (Forecast) the Adjustment Revenue will be the difference between £0 and the total recovered from Generators. The Adjustment Revenue will be expressed as:

$$AdjRevenue = 0 - GCharge(Forecast)"$$

CUSC 14.23

"Adjustment Tariff

(vi) We now need to calculate the Adjustment Tariff. This is calculated by taking the Adjustment Revenue and dividing this by the Chargable Generation Capacity (as per to 14.14.5 (viii) (h)) create a £/kW figure" [emphasis added]

i) Consider the scope of work identified and whether this is achievable within the timeframe outlined in the Ofgem Urgency decision letter

The Workgroup viewed that the scope of work identified is achievable within the timeframe outlined in the Ofgem urgency decision letter.

What is the impact of this change?

Original Proposer's assessment against Code Objectives

Original Proposer's assessment against CUSC Charging Code Objectives	
Relevant Applicable Objective	Identified impact
(d) That compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;	<p>Positive</p> <p>Improves competition by reducing competitive disadvantage of Generators who pay expensive GB TNUoS charges (transmission connected and large distribution connected), compared with Generators in other countries and markets who do not.</p> <p>Also improves effective competition with small distribution connected Generators and Demand.</p> <p>Improves predictability of TNUoS charges. Further details can be found within the 'Proposer's Solution' section.</p>
(e) That compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard	<p>Positive</p> <p>More cost reflective of the drivers of network investment according to a CBA and SQSS. Further details can be found within the 'Proposer's Solution' section.</p>

licence condition C11 requirements of a connect and manage connection);	
(f) That, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses and the ISOP business*;	Positive There appears to be a growing difference in average locations of generation versus Demand. This means any detrimental impacts caused by using an inappropriate reference node is already large and likely to worsen over time. This adds to the importance of addressing this defect in a timely way.
(g) Compliance with the Electricity Regulation and any relevant legally binding decision of the European Commission and/or the Agency **; and	Neutral
(h) Promoting efficiency in the implementation and administration of the system charging methodology.	Neutral

* See *Electricity System Operator Licence*

**The Electricity Regulation referred to in objective (g) is Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast) as it has effect immediately before IP completion day as read with the modifications set out in the SI 2020/1006.

Proposer's assessment of the impact of the modification on the stakeholder / consumer benefit categories

Stakeholder / consumer benefit categories	Identified impact
Improved safety and reliability of the system	<p>Positive</p> <p>By making charges more cost reflective and improving effective competition, this will tend to make it easier for other policy tools to deliver safety and reliability of the system.</p>
Lower bills than would otherwise be the case	<p>Positive</p> <p>By making charges more cost reflective and improving effective competition, this will tend to incentivise more efficient investment decisions for both generation and Demand Users. This will tend to result in a more economically efficient energy system at lower total system cost and a lower cost to customers over the long term.</p>
Benefits for society as a whole	<p>Positive</p> <p>By making charges more cost reflective and improving effective competition, this will tend to incentivise more efficient investment decisions for both generation and Demand Users. This will tend to result in a more economically efficient energy system at lower total system cost and a lower cost to customers over the long term.</p>
Reduced environmental damage	<p>Positive</p> <p>By making charges more cost reflective and improving effective competition, this will tend to incentivise more efficient investment decisions for both generation and Demand Users. This will tend to result in a more economically efficient</p>

	energy system at lower total system cost and a lower cost to customers over the long term.
Improved quality of service	<p>Positive</p> <p>By making charges more cost reflective and improving effective competition, this will tend to incentivise more efficient investment decisions for both generation and Demand Users. This will tend to result in a more economically efficient energy system at lower total system cost and a lower cost to customers over the long term.</p>

Workgroup Vote

The Workgroup met on 03 September 2025 to carry out their Workgroup Vote. The full Workgroup Vote can be found in **Annex 12**. The table below provides a summary of the Workgroup Members view on the best option to implement this change.

For reference the Applicable CUSC (charging) Objectives are:

- d) *That compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;*
- e) *That compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with standard licence condition C11 requirements of a connect and manage connection);*
- f) *That, so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses and the ISOP business*;*

g) *Compliance with the Electricity Regulation and any relevant legally binding decision of the European Commission and/or the Agency **; and*

h) *Promoting efficiency in the implementation and administration of the system charging methodology.*

** See Electricity System Operator Licence*

***The Electricity Regulation referred to in objective (g) is Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast) as it has effect immediately before IP completion day as read with the modifications set out in the SI 2020/1006.*

The Workgroup concluded by majority (7 out of 9 votes) that the Original better facilitated the Applicable Objectives than the Baseline.

Option	Number of voters that voted this option as better than the Baseline
Original	7

Code Administrator Consultation Summary

The Code Administrator Consultation was issued on the 09 October 2025 closed on 31 October 2025 and received eleven non-confidential responses and one confidential response. A summary of the responses can be found in the table below, and the full responses can be found in **Annex 15**.

Code Administrator Consultation summary	
Question	
Do you believe that the CMP423 Original Proposal better facilitates the CUSC Applicable Objectives?	The following numbers of respondents believed the objectives were better facilitated by the Original Proposal than the

	Baseline: Eight for d), eight for e), three for f), two for g) and two for h).
Do you have a preferred proposed solution?	Eight respondents preferred the Original solution and three respondents preferred the Baseline.
Do you support the proposed implementation approach?	Ten out of eleven respondents supported the implementation approach. Two of these respondents stated it should not be implemented earlier than 1 April 2027 to allow parties sufficient time to account for the resulting impacts on tariffs.
Do you have any other comments?	<p>Respondents supportive of the proposal noted that implementing a Generation-weighted reference node for TNUoS charges would create a more accurate, cost-reflective, and proportionate charging framework, as network costs are primarily driven by generation changes rather than Demand. Respondents felt this approach would help address current market distortions, support fairer competition and provide investment certainty.</p> <p>Respondents unsupportive of the proposal raised concerns about the insufficient justification, particularly due to questionable assumptions regarding static Demand and generation displacement. Respondents argued that the proposal does not adequately reflect the realities of a growing electricity system and may create conflicting price signals, unresolved interactions with other industry</p>

	modifications, and fails to address the zero-price floor issue effectively.
Do you agree with the Workgroup's assessment that the modification does not impact the Electricity Balancing Regulation (EBR) Article 18 terms and conditions held within the Code?	All respondents agreed with the Workgroup's assessment that the modification does not impact the Electricity Balancing Regulation.
Legal text issues raised in the consultation	
No legal text issues were raised	
EBR issues raised in the consultation	
No EBR issues were raised	

Panel Recommendation vote

The Panel met on the 28 November 2025 to carry out their recommendation vote.

They assessed whether a change should be made to the CUSC by assessing the proposed change and any alternatives against the Applicable Objectives.

Vote 1: Does the Original, facilitate the Applicable Objectives better than the Baseline?

Panel Member: **Andrew Enzor, User's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Yes
Voting Statement						
ACO(d): CMP423 better facilitates competition both between generators in GB and between generators in GB and those in interconnected markets.						

Within GB: the asymmetric generation signal puts significantly greater risk on generators in the North compared to those in the South. Market developments are expected to increase the magnitude of the relative locational signal between the extremes of the system, as more generation (e.g. offshore wind) connects further away from demand than has historically been the case. Other CUSC modifications, including some in progress, may have the same effect, for example an increase to the Expansion Constant would increase the magnitude of the relative location signal between the extremes of the system. The impacts of such changes is currently much more severe in the North due to the asymmetric signal. CMP423 would create a symmetric signal, and as a result a better balance of risk between generators in different parts of the system.

Between GB and interconnected markets: generators in GB currently face higher transmission charges than those in most interconnected markets. CMP423 would reduce the average generator charge to zero, removing this disparity and creating a level playing field.

ACO(e): the generation weighted reference node better reflects the physical realities of the system as it exists today and in the near future. Additional demand on the system is met by additional generation, not by reduced demand elsewhere. Hence it is more cost-reflective to observe network impacts by offsetting incremental demand with incremental generation based on where generation is located (a generation weighted reference node) than where demand is located (a demand weighted reference node).

ACO(f), (g) and (h): no impact

Panel Member: **Andy Pace, Consumer's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Neutral	No	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	No
Voting Statement						
This mod proposes to change the reference node used in the transport model from a demand-weighted to a generation-weighted reference node. The rationale for this						

change is that incremental generation offsets other generation and therefore the impact should be measured against a generation rather than a demand reference node to determine locational charges. Our assessment is that the primary purpose of generation is to service demand and that the system is therefore demand led. As GB moves towards net zero, we expect demand to increase significantly as we decarbonise. Therefore, the fundamental driver of locational charges should be a demand-weighted reference node. We consider that moving to a generation-weighted reference code would result in a less cost reflective signal which does not better facilitate relevant objective (e) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between transmission licensees which are made under and accordance with the STC) incurred by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses.

Panel Member: **Binoy Dharsi, User's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Y

Voting Statement

The original solution reduces the magnitude of the Generation Adjustment Tariff which can reduce distortions across generation and demand across different voltages, co-located arrangements, and behind customer meters.

This solution also appears to improve compliance to EC838/2010 as it reduces the likelihood of breaching the 0.00 – 2.50 €/MWh range.

The solution developed retains the essential locational differential between generators located across GB. The transfer in revenue recovery from generators to demand users is not additional. Any perceived windfall gain that may be attributable to existing generators will be modest to low against the overall benefit from this solution.

It is therefore assessed as slightly positive against Applicable CUSC Objective d).

Demand Users overwhelming contribute towards the majority of transmission charges. With a significant capacity of generation expecting to connect over the next decade,

generators will simply reflect the growing generation adjustment tariff credit into CfD bids. This is then indirectly collected via the CfD levy imposed solely on demand users. Transferring revenue directly to demand Users via TNUoS is perceived to be more efficient.

The original solution is also perceived to be positive against Applicable CUSC Objective e).

The rationale is that the workgroup report details how the Generation Weighted Reference Node aligns closer with the Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS). This is important because the SQSS is understood to drive the modelling used to derive the strategic and spatial planning process.

It would be useful to investors for Ofgem to assess this modification along with others that intend to improve cost reflective siting signals in a timely manner. They cannot forecast developments being assessed during the ongoing Reformed National Pricing process but should have confidence on what the signals could be for TNUoS should it remain the prominent siting signal in the future.

Panel Member: **Dan Arrowsmith, NESO Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Neutral	No	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	No

Voting Statement

NESO believes the CMP423 solution is negative in respect of ACO (e), as we do not believe that the proposed move to a generation-weighted reference node would increase cost-reflectivity of TNUoS charges. The argument for a generation-weighted reference node being more cost reflective hinges on an assumption that new generation displaces generation elsewhere on the network, and that demand is roughly static. This assumption was broadly valid years ago, however it is no longer valid: significant growth in electricity demand is expected as we transition to net zero, with decarbonisation efforts resulting in electrification of many forms of existing energy demand. This means that new generation capacity will need to be installed to meet this increased level of demand, thus NESO believes that the status quo – a

demand weighted reference node – is more cost reflective of the expanding electricity system. I.e. new generation capacity meeting, and being driven by, increasing levels of system demand.

Therefore, NESO feels this mod does not better facilitate the CUSC objectives and should be rejected.

NESO notes that the above view on applicable objective e) is based on the current CUSC methodology, which is under review in Reformed National Pricing. It may be that the relevant parts of the CUSC methodology are significantly modified by Reformed National Pricing, and if that happens, then NESO's view may change.

Panel Member: **Garth Graham, User's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Neutral	Yes

Voting Statement

This proposal does better facilitate Applicable Objectives (d), (e) and (f) whilst being neutral in terms of (g) and (h).

At the core of this proposal is the changing of the reference node from demand to generation.

Having considered the Workgroup Report alongside the responses to the Code Administrator Consultation, the conclusion is that this proposal, will, in my view, provide a suitable reflection (within the charging methodology) of the current (and anticipated) situation with respect to connections on the NETS.

I believe that by changing the reference node (as set out in this proposal) it will result in a charging methodology which better facilitates (than the baseline) effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity as well as also resulting in charges which reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs incurred whilst also practically and properly taking into account developments in the TO and NESO businesses (as prescribed by their respective licences)

Panel Member: **Joe Colebrook, User's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Yes

Voting Statement

Objective d) Positive – CMP423 should encourage demand to locate closer to generation centres (often the North) and provide more efficient long-term investment signals. Current tariff gradient changes expose northern generators to disproportionately high risks, since multiplier shifts have a large absolute impact on their charges. By contrast, southern generators, with charges close to £0, face minimal absolute risk when multipliers change. This modification provides a better allocation of risk between generators at different locations that arises from changes in tariff gradient by reducing the disproportionate exposure to risk for northern generators. A more equal risk premium should increase competition in the supply of electricity.

I note that many generators have long-term CFDs with a fixed price, which does not change based on TNUOS charges. This change could provide a windfall to generators that already have a CFD (subsidy). This may distort the market and reduce competitiveness. The discussion on CFDs has not considered generators with existing CFDs but has considered the impact on future CFD rounds. However, I believe overall the modification is positive for competition.

Objective e) Positive – An increase in generation means that additional output from a generator displaces alternative generation, either by competing for contracts such as CfD or CM, or by causing another generator to close. A reduction in generation, for example, through closure, leads to compensating increases in alternative generation via investment, contracts, or capacity mechanisms, or prevents another generator from closing. An increase in demand results in more generation through investment or contracts, and unlike generation, demand is not capped, so one user's increase in demand does not reduce others' demand, contrary to the Baseline assumption. A reduction in demand reduces generation through closures or reduced investment, but again, demand is not capped, so one user's reduction in demand does not increase others' demand, which the Baseline incorrectly assumes.

Some consultation responses suggest that a forecast increase in UK demand over the next few years means this modification is not cost-reflective, but I think this response misunderstands that TNUOS is a locational investment signal and is to reflect the costs of incremental changes. I do not believe the overall trend of demand is relevant to this discussion.

Objective f) neutral – No impact on Transmission licensees’ transmission businesses and the ISOP business. The Original is considering the proportion of revenue that is recovered from different uses and is does not impact the total amount of revenue for Transmission and ISOP businesses, and does not impact any processes within Transmission and ISOP businesses.

Objective g) neutral – No impact on compliance with the Electricity Regulation and any Relevant Legally Binding Decisions of the European Commission and/or the Agency.

Objective h) neutral – No impact on the efficiency or administration of the CUSC. The work that the NESO Charging Team needs to complete remains unchanged.

Panel Member: **Lauren Jauss, User’s Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	No	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Yes

Voting Statement

d) This modification is positive for competition because it increases the number of zones which will have a locational signal for demand. If CMP440 is approved, this modification will help to reduce any remaining risk that the cost of consumption in any period is negative.

There are also benefits from this modification in having a symmetrical magnitude in positive and negative tariffs. The appropriateness and impact of positive and negative charges on users should get equal consideration in future charging developments.

This modification also removes the likelihood of requiring and/or magnitude of an Adjustment tariff. Historically, there has been concern that this tariff could simply be

removed, even if it would otherwise be non-zero, and therefore having a large Adjustment tariff has added uncertainty to charges. Substantially reducing or setting the Adjustment tariff to effectively be zero through this modification and redistributing the Adjustment value directly through locational tariffs would significantly reduce charging uncertainty.

However, I believe the modification is slightly negative against objective e) on cost reflectivity because it would result in a different distribution of charges because of an incorrect application of the year round shared/not shared approach. This modification essentially redistributes the value of the Adjustment into the locational tariffs, but the distribution is different and incorrect. In the Baseline, tariffs are derived at each locational node by incrementally increasing generation at that node to meet incremental demand distributed across all demand nodes to assess network use (whilst maintaining the same levels of generation at every other node). The Adjustment tariff is subsequently derived much later using year round shared/not shared expected charging revenue. However, in the Original methodology, tariffs are derived at each locational node by comparing incremental generation at that node with the alternative of incremental generation distributed across all other generation nodes (whilst maintaining the same levels of demand at every other node). The problem with the Original is that the comparison between generation at one node with generation at all others is that the comparison is based on generation scaling only and does not consider the extent to which sharing applies at the other generation nodes. The outcome is that Year Round tariffs would be generally lower in magnitude in the Original than they should be, so this results in the Adjustment value being disproportionately redistributed to benefit those that pay higher Year Round tariffs.

However, whilst this modification does not treat sharing as correctly as the Baseline, I believe that sharing needs a more fundamental review because loads factors have changed materially since the sharing methodology and associated parameters were derived. I believe there is an over estimate of the shared pot and an under estimate of the not shared pot compared with reality. The sharing methodology considers that a 50/50 split of intermittent and conventional capacity is optimal but this is based on load factors which would have been approximately 60% for conventional and 30% for intermittent at the time. This is now clearly out of date with falling conventional generation load factors and increasing capacity of batteries, as well as much higher load factor offshore wind. If the not shared pot should be higher and is corrected then I believe the problem of GRN incorrectly representing sharing becomes even more

acute. I believe these aspects should be taken into consideration as part of the reformed national pricing package if relevant depending on future methodology.

However, the benefits of this mod outweigh, I believe, the more detailed problem of sharing cost reflectivity which could subsequently be addressed after this mod is implemented, if necessary for RNP arrangements.

Panel Member: **Shane Cracknell, User's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Neutral	Yes

Voting Statement

Under the CMP423 methodology, the comparison between conventional and renewable generation becomes more transparent because the generation weighted reference node removes distortions created by demand balancing.

This ensures that all technologies are assessed on a consistent basis.

Any differences that emerge between conventional and renewable plant reflect genuine locational and system cost characteristics rather than methodological bias.

d) I voted yes because I believe the Original Proposal improves competitive neutrality. By shifting to a generation weighted reference node, it provides more accurate locational signals for all generators (renewable and conventional alike) which in my view reduces distortions and supports fairer competition.

e) I supported this objective because the proposal better aligns network charges with the real cost drivers on the system. The clearer and more accurate cost signals improve investment certainty and make the charging framework more transparent.

f) I voted yes here because the methodology change more accurately reflects how today's transmission system is influenced by generation patterns. I consider this alignment important for ensuring that charging signals remain relevant as the system continues to evolve.

g) I took a neutral position because, while the proposal is consistent with regulatory requirements, I do not see it as materially strengthening or weakening compliance compared to the current baseline.

h) I also chose neutral for this objective because I do not expect the proposal to significantly change the administrative burden of the charging methodology. It introduces a methodological refinement, but this does not materially affect the efficiency of implementation or administration supports a more accurate and objective charging framework.

Panel Member: **Kyran Hanks, User's Panel Member**

	Better facilitates AO (d)?	Better facilitates AO (e)?	Better facilitates AO (f)?	Better facilitates AO (g)?	Better facilitates AO (h)?	Overall (Y/N)
Original	Yes	Yes	Yes	Neutral	Neutral	Yes

Voting Statement

(d) Reducing the adjustment charge makes the overall charges more cost reflective. As does that move from demand weighted to generation weighted as I consider generation to be more susceptible to TNUoS signals and differences than demand. As such, the proposal will enhance competition between generators

(e) Reducing the adjustment charge makes the overall charges more cost reflective. As does that move from demand weighted to generation weighted as I consider generation to be more susceptible to TNUoS signals and differences than demand.

(f) The growth in generation necessary to meet the growth in demand, as well as the change in the mix of generation implied by the route to net zero (which I consider is relevant with respect to objective (f)), mean that this proposal properly takes account of developments in the transmission licensees businesses.

(g) neutral

(h) neutral

Vote 2 – Which option best meets the Applicable Objectives?

Panel Member	Best Option	Which objectives does this option better facilitate? (If baseline not applicable).
Andrew Enzor	Original	d) and e)
Andy Pace	Baseline	N/A
Binoy Dharsi	Original	d) and e)
Dan Arrowsmith	Baseline	N/A
Garth Graham	Original	d) , e) and f)
Joe Colebrook	Original	d) and e)
Kyran Hanks	Original	d), e) and f)
Lauren Jauss	Original	d)
Shane Cracknell	Original	d), e) and f)

The Panel has recommended by majority that the Proposer's solution is implemented.

When will this change take place?

Implementation date

01 April 2027

Date decision required by

No later than 30 September 2026 as it requires a change to Section 14 (Charging Methodologies) – see CMP292.

Sufficiently before implementation to give Users sufficient notice to appropriately take the change into account in their contractual terms and commercial decisions.

It would be beneficial for the AR7 CfD auction round to receive a decision as early as possible during 2026. This is to provide successful CfD bidders better certainty of their TNUoS charges before they reach final investment decision.

Implementation approach

The only change that would be required would be to the way the Tariff and Transport model calculates tariffs. There would be no change to the structure of the tariffs, or any other aspect of charging.

Interactions

<input type="checkbox"/> Grid Code	<input type="checkbox"/> BSC	<input type="checkbox"/> STC	<input type="checkbox"/> SQSS
<input type="checkbox"/> European	<input type="checkbox"/> EBR Article 18	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Other
Network Codes	T&Cs ¹	modifications	

This proposal was developed through the [TNUoS Task Force](#) and has interactions with other Task Force work and modifications. This includes [CMP432](#) (Locational Onshore Security Factor), [CMP440](#) (Re-introduction of Demand TNUoS locational signals by removal of the zero price floor), [CMP442](#) (Introducing the option to fix Generator TNUoS charges) and [CMP444](#) (Introducing a cap and floor to wider generation TNUoS charges).

Acronyms, key terms and reference material

Acronym / key term	Meaning
ACS	Average Cold Spell
ALF	Annual Load Factor
AR7	Allocation Round 7
BESS	Battery Energy Storage Systems
BSC	Balancing and Settlement Code

CBA	Costs, Benefits, and Assumptions
CfD	Contracts for Difference
CMP	CUSC Modification Proposal
CUSC	Connection and Use of System Code
EBR	Electricity Balancing Regulation
ESO	Electricity System Operator
ETYS	Electricity Ten Year Statement
EU	European Union
FES	Future Energy Scenarios
GB	Great Britain
HH	Half Hourly
ICRP	Investment Cost Related Pricing
MWkm	Megawatt kilometre
NETS	National Electricity Transmission System
NESO	National Energy System Operator
NETS SO	National Electricity Transmission System Operator
NHH	Non-Half hourly
NOA	Network Options Assessment
PV	Photovoltaic (solar panel)
REMA	Review of Electricity Market Arrangements
RIDG	Renewable Infrastructure Development Group
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SQSS	Security and Quality of Supply Standards

STC	System Operator Transmission Owner Code
T&Cs	Terms and Conditions
TCR	Targeted Charging Review
TDR	Transmission Demand Residual
TEC	Transmission Entry Capacity
TNUoS	Transmission Network Use of System
VBA	Visual Basic for Applications
WACM	Workgroup Alternative CUSC Modification
£/MWh	Pounds per MegaWatt hour

Reference material

- [TNUoS Task Force](#)
- [CMP292: Introducing a Section 8 cut-off date for changes to the Charging Methodologies](#)
- [CMP423: Generation-weighted Reference Node](#)
- [CMP432: Improve “Locational Onshore Security Factor” for TNUoS Wider Tariffs](#)
- [CMP434: Implementing Connections Reform](#)
- [CMP435: Application of Gate 2 Criteria to existing contracted background](#)
- [CMP440: Re-introduction of Demand TNUoS locational signals by removal of the zero price floor](#)
- [CMP442: Introducing the option to fix Generator TNUoS charges](#)
- [CMP444: Introducing a cap and floor to wider generation TNUoS charges](#)

Annexes

Annex	Information
Annex 01	CMP423 Proposal Form

Annex 02	CMP423 Terms of Reference
Annex 03	CMP423 Generation or Demand-weighted reference node
Annex 04	CMP423 NESO Tariff and Revenue Analysis
Annex 05	CMP423 Multi Year Impact Analysis
Annex 06	CMP423 Interaction with CMP444 Analysis and Discussion
Annex 07	CMP423 Generation Scaling used by SQSS, CBA and FES
Annex 08	CMP423 Additional Proposer Analysis
Annex 09	CMP423 Local Circuit Tariff Impact Analysis
Annex 10	CMP423 Legal Text
Annex 11	CMP423 Workgroup Consultation Responses and Summary
Annex 12	CMP423 Alternative and Workgroup Vote
Annex 13	CMP423 Workgroup Attendance Record
Annex 14	CMP423 Workgroup Action Log
Annex 15	CMP423 Code Administrator Consultation Responses and Summary